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I. INTRODUCTION 
The opening sentence of Respondent Farm Bureau's response brief states, "This case asks 
the Court to decide whether an intentional criminal act of pointing a gun and shooting another 
person can ever be considered an 'accident' covered by insurance." Respondent's Brief, p. 1. The 
answer to the query posed by the Respondent is yes, an intentional act to which an Alford plea was 
entered by the uninsured third-party can constitute an "accident" from the perspective of an 
unsuspecting, insured landowner. As demonstrated below, the district court erred by applying 
flawed Idaho precedent, and in so doing propagated a hazardous standard that this Court must 
correct. 
Throughout its response brief, Farm Bureau attempts to limit this Court from focusing on 
the true underlying issue at bar: that by allowing Farm Bureau to refuse policy coverage to the 
Cooks for Stanczak' s claims, the district court applied a precedent that hurts not just the Cooks, 
but all insured Idaho citizens who own property in Idaho. Any prior Idaho court precedent to the 
contrary should be overturned because the dangerous pattern that the district court adopted from 
the Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox1 and State Farm v. Doe2 cases is inconsistent with Idaho 
premises liability law, and would leave the Cooks and other unsuspecting Idaho property owners 
exposed to liability for the unforeseen intentional acts of others, despite paying for premises 
liability coverage. Thus, this Court must overturn the lower court's decision and correct the 
coverage loophole created by the application of the Wilcox and Doe decisions to the present case. 
1 Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992). 
2 State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,946 P.2d 1333 (1997). 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
In its response brief, Respondent Farm Bureau argues that the district court did not err in 
applying Idaho precedent (which Farm Bureau terms the "causation" test) and finding no coverage 
for Joseph Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. Farm Bureau also contends even if the district 
court erred and a "perspective of the insured" test is applied, Stanczak's claims against the Cooks 
are barred under the business activities, intentional act, and violation of criminal law exclusions of 
the Policy. For the reasons shown below, Farm Bureau's arguments are without merit, and the 
Court should reverse the district court's summary judgment ruling. 
B. The Wilcox and Doe Cases Created Harmful Precedent. 
Farm Bureau argues that this Court should not analyze the Chisholm-Stanczak shooting 
from the insureds' perspective, but should instead view coverage based on the nature of the act 
causing injury. In so asserting, Farm Bureau focuses on the Wilcox and Doe decisions cited by the 
lower court, and argues that the "causation test" (i.e., reviewing coverage based on the act causing 
the injury) adopted by Wilcox and applied by Doe controls. Farm Bureau maintains the "causation 
test" should remain the appropriate standard in Idaho as opposed to the "perspective of the 
insureds" test asserted by Appellants and followed by other jurisdictions. 
In the opening brief, the Cooks discussed at length why the Wilcox and Doe decisions 
revolve around facts dissimilar to the present case, and also why the Wilcox court's reasoning 
behind its adoption of the "causation test" is ambiguous and confusing, thus leading to the district 
court's error. However, it merits reiteration here that not only did the Wilcox and Doe decisions 
create confusion and ambiguity, but they also produced a harmful precedent that exposes Idaho 
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landowners to uncovered civil liability for the intentional acts of a third-party on their property. 
While the Wilcox court purported to focus on the conduct of the insured, Mrs. Wilcox, in its 
coverage analysis, its sudden adoption of the "causation test" in the second to last paragraph of the 
decision created a loophole by which insurers can deny liability coverage to the insured based on 
conduct by someone other than the insured even though the insured remains liable for the third-
party conduct. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. 
The "causation test" cases Farm Bureau cites from other jurisdictions (as well as Wilcox 
and Doe themselves) exhibit precisely the type of unexpected exposure that this Court can 
eliminate on behalf of Idaho insureds by adopting the "perspective of the insured" test. A review 
of the underlying facts of several of these cases uncovers an alarming array of situations in which 
an unsuspecting landowner, like the Cooks, could be found without insurance coverage but still 
liable under applicable negligence laws for the intentional acts of another: 
• Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992) (ex-husband of 
insured sexually abused day-care children on insured's property); 
• State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,946 P.2d 1333 (1997) (son of insureds sexually 
molested daycare child on insureds' property); 
• Allstate Ins. Co v. JJM, 254 Mich. App. 418,657 N.W.2d 181 (2002) (minor party-
goer molested another minor partygoer while at insured's home); 
• Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornwell, 1202 Nev. 303, 90 P.3d 978 (2004) (insureds' adult 
son sexually seduced minor neighbor); 
• Offeaus v. Guthrie, 746 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (insureds' minor son 
murdered neighbor); 
• Allstate v. Hill, 2005 WL 1959560 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (insured's roommate shot 
acquaintance during altercation at home where insured and roommate lived); 
• Miller v. Allstate, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (insured's husband 
molested the couple's grandchildren); 
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• UnitedNat'llns. Co. v.Entm'tGrp.,Inc.,945F.2d210(7thCir.1991)(minorchild 
sexually assaulted in washroom of insured's movie theater); 
• Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Dahms, 842 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. 111. 1994) (bar patron 
assaulted other patron both inside and outside the insured's bar); 
• Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996) (no 
coverage for insured mother whose son participated in the gang-related death of 
another boy); 
• Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (insured school 
bus owner's employee bus driver molested children on bus); 
• Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kienenberger, 257 Mont. 1360, 847 P.2d 1360 
(1993) (adult woman raped by insureds' minor son); 
• Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Co Fat Lee, 439 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2006) (no coverage 
for insureds whose son closed garage door and left car running with son and 
passengers inside, resulting in passengers' deaths); and 
• Hunt v. Capital Indem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (bar patron 
stabbed and killed by other patrons outside of insured's bar). 
While each of the above-listed cases deals with heartbreaking circumstances in which one 
person intentionally injured and even killed another, what is also alarming is that the unsuspecting 
insureds in each case were found to have no coverage for the injuries because the injuries were 
intentionally caused on their property by a third-party, despite pending liability claims against the 
insureds by the victims. Based on the diverse range of unexpected3 occurrences shown above, the 
"causation test" adopted in the Wilcox case and further applied in Doe creates broad exposure on 
behalf of not just a select group of Idaho citizens, but all insured Idaho landowners, including 
parents, roommates, and even small business owners. 
Respondent states that "[b ]ecause Idaho law is settled, the Court need not consider other 
jurisdictions that apply the perspective of the insured test." Respondent's Brief, p. 35. Yet when 
3 Unexpected and without intention or design by the insured. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF: 4 
the "settled" law creates exposure for unanticipated liability for a large percentage of insured 
Idahoans, the Court has a duty to review such law - and considering the precedent of other 
jurisdictions4 is well within the Court's discretion when doing so. Since this Court adopted the 
"causation test" in Wilcox, this Court likewise has the ability to overrule Wilcox and adopt the 
"perspective of the insured" test in light of the clear harm to which the "causation test" exposes 
unwary Idaho landowners who carry liability insurance. 
C. The "Causation Test" is Inconsistent with Idaho Premises Liability Law. 
Farm Bureau alleges in its brief that Stanczak "attempted to manufacture coverage by 
alleging separate allegations of negligence against the insureds, the Cooks." Respondent's Brief, 
p. 22; see also id, p. 16. This assertion is baseless and assumes facts never presented as evidence. 
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks in his lawsuit do not attempt to "manufacture coverage," but 
are consistent with Idaho negligence law under which the Cooks, as landowners, could be found 
to share responsibility for Stanczak's injuries. 
Under Idaho law, the duty that owners and possessors ofland owe to a land entrant depends 
on whether the entrant is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. A licensee is a visitor who goes upon 
the premises of another with the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. The 
duty toward a licensee is such that a landowner is required to share knowledge of dangerous 
conditions or activities on the land with the licensee. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401, 732 P.2d 
369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987). The landowner also owes a duty to a licensee to avoid willfully or 
4 Such precedent, as cited in Appellants' Opening Brief, might include: Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 
140 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 1998) ((quoting Mohn v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, 458 Pa. 576,326 A.2d 346,348 
(1974) ("[T]he fact that the event causing [bodily injury or damage to property] may be traceable to an intentional 
act of a third party does not preclude the occurrence from being an 'accident.'")); and Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dry, 
Inc., 336 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (insured's negligent hiring and retaining of former employee who murdered 
customer was a qualifying "occurrence" under the policy; the court found that the insured's conduct and actions must 
be evaluated, not those of the perpetrator of the intentional act). 
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wantonly injuring him, and to refrain from exposing him to dangerous instrumentalities on the 
premises which are unknown to the licensee. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649,652,671 
P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593,691 P.2d 1208 (1984). 
Stanczak was a licensee on the Cooks property the night Chisholm shot him. Stanczak 
entered onto the Cooks' property at Bloom Lake pursuant to his own purpose of fishing and 
camping and enjoying the lake. R p. 288. The Cooks did not charge a fee for Stanczak or other 
campers to use the property, and the Cooks received no benefit from Stanczak's visit. R pp. 68, 
142, 196, 357, 368, 401. Therefore, under Idaho law the Cooks owed Stanczak a duty to share 
knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land, avoid willfully or wantonly injuring 
him, and avoid exposing him to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. Evans, 112 Idaho at 
401, 732 P.2d at 370; Keller, 105 Idaho at 652, 671 P.2d at 1115. 
The Cooks could be found in breach of this duty by exposing Stanczak to a dangerous and 
violent individual, Michael Chisholm, with multiple firearms in his possession (which he stored in 
the Cooks' caretaker cabin). Stanczak has alleged that, as the owners of the property, the Cooks 
should have known of this dangerous condition on their land. R p. 288. In contrast, Stanczak did 
not know of this condition, and was unable to take precautions for his own safety. Id. Mr. 
Chisholm's intentional actions resulted in Stanczak's injuries. R pp. 290, 297, 300-02. Thus, the 
Cooks' breach of their duty to Stanczak was the proximate cause of Stanczak' s injuries. 
In 1992, when the Wilcox court handed down its decision adopting the "causation test" 
instead of what Respondent calls the "perspective of the insured" test, the court unwittingly created 
a massive liability potential for the average insured Idaho property owner, including the Cooks. 
As noted above, Idaho premises liability law holds a landowner accountable for not sharing 
knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land with a licensee or otherwise exposing 
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the licensee to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 
370; Keller, 105 Idaho at 652, 671 P.2d at 1115. This liability remains even when the landowner 
did not intend for the licensee to be injured. Therefore, in order to protect themselves from 
premises liability, Idaho landowners purchase liability coverage from insurers such as Farm 
Bureau. Yet application of the "causation test" by the Wilcox court, the Doe court, and the district 
court here has allowed insurers to avoid covering the very types of unexpected incidents and 
liability that insureds like the Cooks intend to cover when purchasing liability insurance. 
This in tum exposes Idahoans, including the Cooks, to uncovered personal liability for 
what from their standpoint ( and under the definition adopted in Wilcox5) was an "accident" and 
therefore an "occurrence." The average Idaho landowner is unlikely to understand that their insurer 
will deny coverage, thanks to Wilcox and Doe. And since insurers are certainly more able to be 
aware of this loophole than their insureds, they have the upper hand over insureds in drafting their 
insurance policies to exclude such coverage. 
As such, this Court must overturn the lower court's decision, as refraining to do so not only 
leaves the Cooks exposed, but perpetuates the lack of coverage of other insured Idaho landowners 
as well. 
D. Appellants' Public Policy Argument is not an "Empty Plea." 
In its response, Farm Bureau contends that the Appellants "make an empty plea that to 
'hold there is no coverage under the Policy for Stanczak's claims against the Cooks would in 
essence expose all insureds [sic] citizens ofldaho to personal liability under similar circumstances 
.... "' Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (quoting Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 23). As shown above, 
5 Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. 
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Appellants' public policy argument is certainly not an empty plea, but a demonstration to this 
Court of the great harm that exists in Idaho with respect to civil liability not covered by insurance. 
Respondent further states: 
Farm Bureau asserts that the way the law is in Idaho helps its citizens because it 
allows insurance companies to better assess their risk so that appropriate premiums 
rates can be set. The holding advocated by the Cooks would significantly hinder 
insurance companies' ability to assess that risk and the multitudes of scenarios that 
would arise relating to insurance coverage for certain intentional torts or criminal 
actions. Public policy arguments cannot enlarge the agreements between insureds 
and insurers. The Cooks' public policy arguments can also be rejected. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 36. What Farm Bureau neglects to point out to the Court is that the current 
state of the law requires a potentially insured Idaho citizen to perform the very type of complex 
risk assessment that Farm Bureau believes insurance companies would be hindered from doing 
under the "perspective of the insured" test. Why are Idaho citizens better-able to perform such a 
risk analysis than insurers (who would certainly have better access to data related to potential 
claims and scenarios of intentional torts and criminal actions)? Farm Bureau does not expound 
upon this assertion other than to imply that an insurer and insured are on the same playing field 
when entering into insurance agreements. Such reasoning is clearly flawed and self-serving, and 
this Court should not be deceived by it. 
E. The Business Activities Exclusion is not Applicable Here. 
In its response brief, Farm Bureau seeks to have the judgment for reasons presented in the 
summary judgment, but not relied upon by the trial court. Farm Bureau contends that even if 
Wilcox and Doe were overturned, the Policy's business activities exclusion would exclude 
coverage for the Cooks' claim. Respondent's Brief, p. 36. 
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Farm Bureau is incorrect, and misreads the explicit language of its own policy. The Policy 
defines "business" as: 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity, 
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming. Business 
Includes rental of all or any part of an Insured location to others, or held for rental 
by you, other than: 
1. Your residence premises if rented occasionally; 
2. Garages, if not more than three car spaces are rented; 
3. One-, two-, three-, or four-family dwellings described In the Declarations; or 
4. Yourfarm. 
R p. 96 (emphasis in original). 
In its brief, Respondent attempts to show that the Cooks operated a business at Bloom 
Lake, arguing that they engaged in an activity for compensation at the premises. Farm Bureau 
argues the Cooks received compensation for services to campers by soliciting donations from 
campers in order to cover the cost of infrastructure. Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-38. Yet Merriam-
Webster defines "donation" as: 
1 : the making of a gift esp. to a charity 
2 : a free contribution : GIFT 
THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY at 155 (1995) (Note: this is the entire definition provided). 
How can a gift or free contribution be a form of compensation? Insinuating that the receipt of 
donations at a campground is somehow the receipt of compensation is a flawed argument, and 
would therefore imply that clothing donations to charity thrift stores are also the receipt of 
compensation by the store. The Court should therefore disregard Farm Bureau's poorly-supported 
assertion. 
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Furthermore, an insured's farm is not a business under the Policy (see above), which 
explicitly defines "farming" as 
the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or keeping of livestock, 
fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small mammals primarily for 
fur production. It Includes wholesale but not retail sales, except incidental retail 
sales of your unprocessed farm products with the resulting gross income being less 
than 25% of your combined farming gross income. 
R p. 97 ( emphasis added; emphasis in original omitted). One of the reasons Stanczak was at Bloom 
Lake on the evening in question was to catch fish. R p. 288. By keeping fish in the lake on their 
property, the Cooks clearly fall within the farming exception to a business activity under the 
Policy. The business activities exclusion therefore is inapplicable to Stanczak's claims against the 
Cooks. 
It is also important to note that any pre-discovery, unilateral assumption made by Stanczak 
regarding the supposed business structure of Bloom Lake ( e.g., by including the phrase "d/b/a 
Bloom Lake Campground" in his Complaint, which was subsequently amended to omit this 
designation6) carries no weight with respect to the actual business structure, or lack thereof, of the 
Cooks' Bloom Lake property. It is puzzling why Respondent Farm Bureau would place this 
irrelevant subject before the Court other than to divert it from the true matter at hand. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 38 fn. 5. 
F. The Intentional Act Exclusion is not Applicable Here. 
Farm Bureau also asserts that the intentional act exclusion of the Policy would exclude 
coverage of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. Respondent's Brief, pp. 1, 16, 40-41. The Court 
should note that the Cooks have at no time stated or alleged that Chisholm was their agent or an 
6 See R p. 295. 
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insured under the Policy, contrary to Farm Bureau's insinuations. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 39-
41. The intentional act exclusion states: 
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II except Coverage 
M. Section II does not cover bodily injury or property damage: 
*** 
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply to 
the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property; .... 
R p. 45 ( emphasis in original). 
Chisholm is not an insured under the Policy. R p. 23; Respondent's Brief, pp. 4, 10. Thus, 
the intentional act exclusion does not apply to his actions, but only to the actions of the insureds, 
the Cooks. R p. 45. The Cooks have at no point acknowledged any involvement in Chisholm's 
intentional shooting of Stanczak, nor is there evidence in the record of any such involvement by 
the Cooks. Therefore, the insured Cooks did not intentionally cause the alleged bodily injury, and 
the intentional act exclusion is irrelevant to the case at bar. 
G. The Violation of Criminal Law Exclusion is not Applicable Here. 
Farm Bureau also argues that the criminal act exclusion of the Policy would exclude 
coverage of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. Respondent's Brief, pp. 1, 6, 10, 16, 41. The 
analysis of this erroneous assertion is identical to that for an intentional act under Section F. above. 
The criminal act exclusion states: 
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II except Coverage 
M. Section II does not cover bodily injury or property damage: 
*** 
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14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law, Youth Rehabilitation Act, or similar 
law, except traffic violations, if committed by any insured; .... 
R pp. 45-46 ( emphasis in original). 
Again, Chisholm is not an insured under the Policy. R p. 23; Respondent's Brief, pp. 4, 10. 
The Cooks have never stated or alleged that Chisholm was their agent or an insured, which 
Respondent acknowledges. See Respondent's Brief, p. 39. Thus, like the intentional act exclusion, 
the criminal act exclusion does not apply to Chisholm's actions, but only to the actions of the 
insureds, the Cooks. The insured Cooks did not violate a criminal law, and were not criminally 
charged or prosecuted for Stanczak's injuries. Therefore, the criminal act exclusion is also 
irrelevant to the present matter. 
H. Farm Bureau is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees. 
The Respondent argues that it is entitled to attorney fees because "the Cooks merely repeat 
the same arguments they made below, asking the Court to set aside clearly binding Idaho law 
without any supporting justification .... " Respondent's Brief, p. 42. This statement is incorrect 
and self-serving. Regarding the award of attorney fees, this Court has previously stated: 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1, a party may be subject to sanctions if an 
appeal is brought frivolously and without foundation. "Under IAR Rule 11.1, 
sanctions will be awarded on appeal if the party requesting them proves: (1) the 
other party's arguments are not well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law, or 
made in good faith, and (2) the claims were brought for an improper purpose, such 
as unnecessary delay or increase in the costs of litigation." Frank v. Bunker Hill 
Co., 142 Idaho 126, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005) (citing Painter, 138 Idaho at 315, 
63 P.3d at 441). 
Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 51, 156 P.3d 545, 552 (2007). As the Appellants' briefing shows, 
the Cooks are clearly justified and reasonable in seeking the guidance of this Court with respect to 
the dangerous coverage loophole created by the Wilcox and Doe cases. The Cooks have more than 
adequately demonstrated the foundation upon which they have appealed the district court's ruling. 
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The Cooks' supporting arguments are made in good faith and are grounded in the facts shown 
above, and were not brought frivolously or for an unnecessary purpose. Therefore, Farm Bureau 
is not entitled to fees should it prevail. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. For the 
reasons set forth in this appeal, the trial court's summary judgment should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of October, 2017. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendants Cook 
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